Package Document, Tonkin Gulf

Fitzgerald
The Vietnam War
Tonkin Gulf Package of Documents
Compiled by John J. Fitzgerald
March 1999
Introduction
Facts On Tonkin

What happened in Tonkin Gulf in the summer of 1964?

In the months of August and September of 1964, there were a total of three allegations of events or incidents that took place in the Gulf of Tonkin that involved American naval vessels.

•On the 2nd of August the Maddox was alleged to have been attacked.

•On the 4th of August the Maddox and the Turner Joy were alleged to have been attacked.

•On September 18th, two destroyers, the U.S.S. Richard S. Edwards (DD - 950) and the U.S.S. Morton (DD - 948) were alleged to have been attacked.

According to both the North Vietnamese and the United States, the first event did occur. According to the North Vietnamese, but not the United States, the second event did not occur. According to both the United States and the North Vietnamese, the third event did not occur.

See: Eugene G. Windchy, Tonkin Gulf (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1971). pp. 32 - 33, 263 - 268. The incidents involving the Edwards and the Morton were dismissed as illusory because there was "no credible" evidence of an attack.

What did take place in the Tonkin Gulf in the summer of 1964? We still can not say for sure, because some material is still classified, but the following summary seems to be a reasonable portrayal of what the current evidence indicates. It is derived from the information and analyses produced by a number of sources and which has become available to the public since 1964 and up through the 1980's.

On August 2nd, 1964, the destroyer Maddox was conducting a DeSoto patrol along the coast of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. The ship was equipped with sophisticated electronic equipment that was designed to gather information on coastal defenses and electronic capabilities of the North Vietnamese. It was probably covering for an Operation Plan 34A attack being delivered simultaneously against the DRV. The Maddox soon came under attack by three patrol craft of the DRV navy. The Maddox turned away and proceeded to distance itself from the oncoming patrol craft. The DRV boats pursued and the Maddox fired at them. It fired first at the craft and the patrol craft fired bullets and torpedoes at the Maddox. They succeeded in hitting the Maddox with one bullet. Shells from the Maddox and some bullets from US Navy aircraft from the carrier USS Ticonderoga hit the three patrol craft. This combined fire disabled one boat severely and chased off the others. No American planes were hit. Although one damaged itself in a tight turn. One of the pilots flying on this mission was Commander James Bond Stockdale of the Ticonderoga.

President Lyndon B. Johnson, on the advice of Secretary of Defense, Robert S. McNamara, accepted the U.S. Navy's claim that the ship was in international waters and that the action was an unprovoked attack on the Maddox in clear violation of the international principle of free navigation of the high seas. President Johnson had authorized these DeSoto patrols off the coast of the DRV. When they had been executed previously, there was no military response to them by the DRV government. This time they were conducted very close to an Operation 34A attack on coastal installations of the DRV.

Johnson ordered that the missions be continued and reinforced with the addition of an extra destroyer, U.S.S. Turner Joy and an extra aircraft carrier, U.S.S. Constellation. This would constitute an escalation of our presence in the Tonkin Gulf. The command of the two destroyers was placed under the control of the special electronics warfare officer, Captain John J. Herrick, who was aboard the Maddox .

In the evening of August 4th, 1964 both the Maddox and the Turner Joy would report that they were under attack by enemy patrol craft. The basis for these reports was the interpretation of sonar and radar readings made in the dark of the night in a strong thunderstorm. The visual "sightings" were made by unseasoned sailors. Those on board one ship, the Maddox , of course, were keenly aware that they had in fact been engaged in a fire exchange two days earlier. Imagination and fear provided a convenient link for the transition from possibility to probability.

After aircraft from the Constellation and the Ticonderoga were dispatched to the scene and they reported no visual sightings of enemy ships, considerable skepticism grew as to whether there was an actual attack. The pilots of the aircraft reported their doubts. Officers on the two destroyers reported their doubts concerning what actually happened out there. Commander James Stockdale again flew a mission from the Ticonderoga and he reported seeing no enemy ships in the area of the Maddox or the Turner Joy .

Nonetheless, the U.S. Navy sent the message to Washington that there was an attack. It then reported that there w as some confusion, but it finally sent the word that there was an attack. McNamara demanded confirmation and the Navy declared that it had confirmed it. The final confirmation of the attacks came from Hawaii and Admiral U.S. Grant Sharp, not from the Tonkin Gulf.

The same day, President Johnson ordered a "retaliation" strike against North Vietnam by American naval aircraft. Later, he would ask the US Congress to give him a resolution of support for what he was doing. This would be known as the "Tonkin Gulf Resolution" and would be used as if it was a declaration of war to defend the American escalation of the war in Vietnam. The 64 sorties flown against the DRV in "retaliation" would soon be joined by thousands of others. The 190 Americans killed in Vietnam by mid-1964 would soon be joined by more than 50,000 more.

The four definitive studies of the Tonkin Gulf incidents are: Anthony Austin, The President's War (Philadelphia: J.P. Lippincott, 1971); John Galloway, The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution (Rutherford, New Jersey: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1970); Joseph C. Goulden, Truth is the First Casualty (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1969); and Eugene G. Windchy, Tonkin Gulf (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1971). Peter Dale Scott has an interesting chapter on the Tonkin Gulf in his The War Conspiracy (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1972). Also see, U.S. News and World Report , 23 July 1984 for the essay, "The 'Phantom Battle' That Led To War". Edwin E. Moise's book should be added to this list. See: Edwin E. Moise, Tonkin Gulf and the Escalation of the Vietnam War (Chapel Hill, North Carolina: The University of North Carolina Press, 1996).

Henry Cabot Lodge was the American Ambassador to Vietnam

Source: Foreign Relations of the United States 1964 - 1968, Volume 1
Department of State, Washington, D.C., page 456.

198. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State 1

Saigon, June 5, 1964--2 p.m.

2412. Literally eyes only for Rusk and McNamara from Lodge.

1. It would help here, and possibly in Laos and Thailand, if there were some screams from North Viet-Nam that they had been hit. They are really looking much too tall, particularly considering the military potential of both sides, which is so heavily in our favor. They are able to enjoy the great advantage of total silence which makes them look still bigger, whereas the U.S. looks as though we are talking a great deal without doing very much.

2. There must be a number of different ways to make them scream. Could rocket carrying planes, flying along the North Viet-Nam-Laos border, let something go on the pretext that they had been fired on and were firing back? Could something be done some night in North Viet-Nam, possibly using personnel and equipment which would be Vietnamese [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]; can Tchepone not be hit immediately?

3. We want a scream from them that they had been hit by something coming from our side. I would not object if they blamed us. They could prove nothing. We could either be totally silent, or challenge them to provide proof, or say we are looking into it.

4. In a situation such as is described above you don't have to escalate if you don't want to. Surely this kind of limited carefully modulated action does not require approval of Congress--especially when it is against North Vietnamese targets which are thoroughly illegal.

5. Not only would screams from the North have a very tonic effect and strengthen morale here; it is also vital to frighten Ho. Do not believe our 34A operations bother him much, if at all. If he is sufficiently frightened and could do so without losing face, he might cease his intrusion, save many lives and avoid the much greater cost to him and to us involved in the procedures discussed in Honolulu. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] should, above all, be able to hold out the prospect of the cessation of punishment and not just a shipment of rice and a verbal assurance that the Americans are really very angry.

6. In this part of the world and in this kind of situation, silence and action often the best ways to achieve results.

Lodge

1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Nodis.

Foreign Relations of the United States

1964 - 1968, Volume 1

Department of State, Washington, D.C., page 458.

199. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Taylor) to the Secretary of Defense (McNamara)1

Washington, June 5, 1964.

CM-1451-64

SUBJECT

Comments of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, on JCSM-471-64, "Objectives and Courses of Action--Southeast Asia"

1. This memorandum transmits the views of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff upon the subject paper in which the Joint Chiefs of Staff (less the Chairman) express their views on two possible alternatives for air strikes against North Vietnam. The first would have the objective of seeking "through military actions to accomplish destruction of the North Vietnamese will and capabilities as necessary to compel the Democratic Government of Vietnam (DRV) to cease providing support to the insurgencies in South Vietnam and Laos". They favor adopting this course of action. They note, however, as a possible lesser alternative the employment of "limited military action which, hopefully, would cause the North Vietnamese to decide to terminate their subversive support of activity in Laos and South Vietnam". If the latter alternative is adopted, they recommend two target complexes in the Appendix of JCSM-471-64 (Vinh and Dien Bien Phu) as appropriate for initial attack.

2. As I understand the distinction between the two alternatives, the first calls for a concurrent attack upon North Vietnamese will and capabilities in order to induce the North Vietnamese to cease their attacks upon their neighbors and in addition, by destroying in large % part their military capabilities, to assure that they cannot resume these attacks. The second alternative places more emphasis on changing the will of the enemy and less emphasis on the destruction of capabilities although the attacks considered upon Vinh and Dien Bien Phu require hundreds of sorties and thus are not of inconsiderable weight.

3. I do not feel these two alternatives as stated are an accurate or complete expression of our choices. It appears to me that there are three patterns from among which we may choose to initiate the attack on North Vietnam. In descending order of weight, they are the following:

a. A massive air attack on all significant military targets in North Vietnam for the purpose of destroying them and thereby making the enemy incapable of continuing to assist the Viet Cong and the Pathet Lao.

b. A lesser attack on some significant part of the military target system in North Vietnam for the dual purpose of convincing the enemy that it is to his interest to desist from aiding the Viet Cong and the Pathet Lao, and, if possible, of obtaining his cooperation in calling off the insurgents in South Vietnam and Laos.

c. Demonstrative strikes against limited military targets to show US readiness and intent to pass to al ternatives 3b or 3a above. These demonstrative strikes would have the same dual purpose as in alternative 3b.

4. The forces required to execute these strike alternatives would vary from a maximum effort by VNAF, Farmgate and US aircraft for alternative 3a to VNAF alone (perhaps stiffened by Farmgate) for alternative 3c. Similarly, the time for executing the attacks would vary from several weeks in the case of alternative 3a to one or two days for alternative 3c.

5. I would not recommend alternative 3a at the outset because it is probably unnecessarily destructive for the purpose of changing the will of the adversary; it limits any possibility of cooperation from Hanoi in calling off the insurgents; and represents such a challenge to the Communist Bloc as to raise considerably the risks of escalation. I would prefer alternative 3b, reserving judgment on the precise target system chosen for the initial attack pending further photography and analysis. However, I feel that it is highly probable that political considerations will incline our responsible civilian officials to opt for alternative 3c and, hence, feel that the Joint Chiefs of Staff should recognize this possibility and develop a plan for possible implementation.

6. In summary, I recommend that JCSM-471-64 be noted and used as appropriate in considerations of a strike program based upon the implementation of alternative 3b, and that the Joint Chiefs of Staff be asked to develop a strike plan based upon a decision to follow alternative 3c.

Maxwell D. Taylor

Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff

Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 69

A 7425, Vietnam 381. Top Secret.

Note: "Farmgate" refers to a program of having an American pilot accompany a Vietnamese pilot in a Vietnamese aircraft. The myth was that the Americans were not carrying out the missions. They were simply advising.

Michael Beschloss, editor. Taking Charge: The Johnson White House Tapes, 1963 - 1964. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1997. pp. 493 - 495.

LBJ Phone Conversations taped at the White House.

MONDAY, AUGUST 3, 1964

ROBERT ANDERSON

9:46 A.M.

THE PREVIOUS DAY, at 3:40 A.M. Washington time, the U.S. destroyer Maddox, on reconnaissance patrol, was attacked in the Gulf of Tonkin by North Vietnamese torpedo boats. The Maddox, joined by aircraft from the nearby aircraft carrier Ticonderoga, damaged two of the boats and left the third dead in the water. Concerned that the assault might have been a local commander's caprice, (1) suspecting that it was in response to United States-backed covert operations, Johnson did not retaliate. Instead he protested the attack to Hanoi. The Maddox and the destroyer C. Turner Joy were ordered to assert the right of freedom of the seas. (2) As this morning's papers reported, Secretary of State Dean Rusk downplayed the incident: "The other side got a sting out of this. If they do it again, they'll get another sting." During a conversation about which corporation leaders might be willing to support Johnson's election campaign, the President relates what happened. [He is talking with Eisenhower's former Treasury Secretary, Robert Anderson, a moderate Republican.]

LBJ: There have been some covert operations in that area that we have been carrying on (3) -- blowing up some bridges and things of that kind, roads and so forth. So I imagine they wanted to put a stop to it. So they...fired and we respond immediately with five-inch [artillery shells] from the destroyer and with planes overhead. And we...knock one of 'em out and cripple the other two. Then we go right back where we were with that destroyer and with another one, plus plenty of planes standing by....

ANDERSON: ...You're going to be running against a man who's a wild man on this subject. (4) Any lack of firmness he'll make up....You've got to do what's right for the country.... But whatever you can do to say, when they shoot at us from the back, we're not soft...we're going to protect ourselves, we'll protect our boys ... I think it's all to the good. (5)

LBJ: Didn't it leave that impression yesterday!

ANDERSON: ... I think a little emphasis on it would be worthwhile.... Don't take my advice on this, because I don't know a damned thing about what happened.

LBJ: What happened was we've been playing around up there (6) and they came out, gave us a warning, and we knocked hell out of 'em.

ANDERSON: That's the best thing in the world you could have done--just

knock hell out of 'em.

LBJ: And we've got our people right there and we haven't pulled out. We've pulled up.

ANDERSON: I haven't heard any adverse criticism from anybody. But I

just know that this fellow's (7) going to play all of the angles.

(1) General Nguyen Dinh Voc, director of the Institute of Military History in Hanoi, affirmed in 1997 that the assault was a local commander's initiative (New York Times Magazine, August 10, 1997).

(2) Ambassador Maxwell Taylor complained from Saigon that failure to respond to an unprovoked attack on a U.S. destroyer in international waters would be taken as a sign "that the U.S. flinches from direct confrontation with the North Vietnamese" (Taylor to Rusk, August 3, 1964, in FRUS, pp. 593-94).

(3) Johnson refers to Op Plan 34-A, the covert action program against North Vietnam he had approved at the start of 1964. On Thursday night, July 30, under 34-A, South Vietnamese patrol boats had shelled two North Vietnamese islands in the Gulf of Tonkin that were suspected to be bases for infiltration of the South.

(4) In his San Francisco acceptance speech, Goldwater had complained that "failures infest the jungles of Vietnam.... Don't try to sweep this under the rug. We are at war in Vietnam. And yet the President...refuses to say...whether or not the objective over there is victory, and his Secretary of Defense continues to mislead and misinform the American people. . . . I needn't remind you, but I will, it has been during Democratic years that a billion persons were cast into Communist captivity and their fates cynically sealed."

(5) Johnson was especially affected by what Anderson said because he thought of him as, to some extent, the voice of Eisenhower. Anderson's suggestion may have shown Johnson what kind of criticism he could expect from even moderate Republicans (whose votes he hoped to win in November) if he did not demonstrate greater toughness at the Gulf of Tonkin.

(6) This refers to Op Plan 34-A and Operation DeSoto reconnaissance patrol vessels, which were collecting radio and radar signals from North Vietnam and China.

(7) Goldwater.

LBJ Phone Conversation at the White House

- - - -

ROBERT McNAMARA

10:20 A.M.

LBJ: I wonder if you don't think if it'd be wise for you and Rusk to get the Speaker and Mansfield to call a group of fifteen or twenty people together from the Armed Services, Foreign Relations. Tell 'em what happened....

McNAMARA: Right. I've been thinking about this myself.

LBJ: They're gonna start an investigation if you don't. . . . You say, "They fired at us, we responded immediately and we took out one of their boats and put the other two running and we're putting out boats right there and we're not running 'em in."

McNAMARA: ...We should also at that time, Mr. President, explain this Op Plan 34-A, these covert operations. There's no question that that had bearing on it. On Friday night, as you probably know, we had four PT boats from Vietnam manned by Vietnamese or other nationals attack two islands....Following twenty-four hours after that, with this destroyer (1) in that same area -- undoubtedly led them (2) to connect the two events.

LBJ: Say that to Dirksen. You notice Dirksen says this morning that "we got to reassess our situation--do something about it." (3) I'd tell him that we're doing what he's talking about.

McNAMARA: ...You want us to do it at the White House or would you rather do it at State or Defense

LBJ: I believe it'd be better to do it up on the Hill.... I'd tell 'em awfully quiet though so they won't go in and be making a bunch of speeches.

. . . .

LBJ: Now I wish that you'd give me some guidance on what we ought to say. I want to leave an impression on background...that we're gonna be firm as hell without saying something that's dangerous....The people that're calling me up ... all feel that the Navy responded wonderfully. And that's good. But they want to be damned sure I don't pull 'em out and run....That's what all the country wants because Goldwater is raising so much hell about how he's gonna blow 'em off the moon. And they say that we oughtn't to do anything that the national interest doesn't require, but we sure ought to always leave the impression that if you shoot at us, you're gonna get hit. (4)

McNAMARA: I think you would want to instruct George Reedy this morning ...to say that you personally have ordered the Navy to carry on the routine patrols off the coast of North Vietnam, to add an additional destroyer to the one that has been carrying on the patrols, to provide an air cap, and to issue instructions to the commanders to destroy any force that attacks our force in international waters. (5)

(1) The Maddox.

(2) The North Vietnamese. (DRV)

(3) Dirksen had told reporters that the attack on the Maddox warranted a "new hard look" at American policy in Southeast Asia: "We must lay all of the cards on the table so that the American people will be fully informed and then take action to correct the situation."

(4) Johnson shows that he has taken Anderson's advice to heart.

(5) Seventy minutes after this talk with McNamara, Johnson told the press that he had "instructed the Navy" to continue the patrols off North Vietnam, add an additional destroyer, provide a combat air patrol over the destroyers, and order commanders of the combat aircraft and the two destroyers to "attack any force which attacks them in international waters" with the objective "not only of driving off the force but destroying it" (FRUS, p.597).

- - - - -

Note: Footnotes have been modified from original source for purposes of clarity.

Source for these tapes is:

Beschloss, Michael R. Taking Charge: The Johnson White House Tapes, 1963 - 1964. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1997. pp. 493 - 496.

Michael Beschloss, editor. Taking Charge: The Johnson White House Tapes, 1963 - 1964. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1997. p 499.

LBJ Phone Conversations taped at the White House.

Tuesday, August 4, 1964

JAMES ROWE

1:35 P.M..

In the midst of the new crisis over the Gulf of Tonkin, Johnson complains to Humphrey's partisan that the Minnesota Senator's garrulousness is endangering national security. His message is that if Humphrey does not stop it, he will not be Vice President.

LBJ: Our friend Hubert is just destroying himself with his big mouth.

ROWE: Is he talking again?

LBJ: Yeah, all the time. And you just can't stop it. . . . Every responsible person

gets frightened when they see him. . . . Yesterday morning, he went on TV and

. . . just blabbed everything that he had heard in a briefing(1) . . . . They said. . . "How would you account for these PT boat attacks on our destroyers when we are innocently out there in a gulf, sixty miles from shore?"" . . . Humphrey said, "Well, we have been carrying on some operations in that area . . . . where we have been going in and knocking out roads and petroleum things." And that is exactly what we have been doing (2)

ROWE: Good Lord!

LBJ: The damned fool . . . just ought to keep his goddamned big mouth shut on

foreign affairs, at least until the election is over....They don't pay him to do this. This is just not like he's getting a fee to speak to the druggists. He is just doing this free and he's hurting his government. And he's hurting us!

LBJ: This by no way... a commitment ... because I want to have lots of talks

before I ever agree on who I'm going to recommend. But...he ought to... pretty well stay out of the delicate, technical field of...what the Communists are thinking....He just yak-yak-yak-yak. Just dancing around with the bald head. . . . . That can ruin a man mighty quick.

(1) On the August 2 actions in the Tonkin Gulf.

(2) Johnson refers to Op Plan 34-A.

271. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam

Washington, August 3, 1964--8:49 p.m.

336. From the Secretary to the Ambassador. Ref Embtel 282. We have been very sensitive here to the considerations you raise reftel. We would hope that part of the problem has been met by President's public statement today, which you have already received. We have asked JCS to insure that you receive copies of the implementing orders to the appropriate commanders through military channels. Suggestions made in b, c and d reftel are currently being considered in context OPLAN 34A. Significant additions have been made to list of targets for marine operations and these will be transmitted to you shortly.

We believe that present OPLAN 34A activities are beginning to rattle Hanoi, and Maddox incident is directly related to their effort to resist these activities. We have no intention yielding to pressure.

In your discretion you may pass these thoughts along to Gen. Khanh. You may also reiterate to him, but only if you believe it appropriate, our concern that actions against the North be limited for the present to the OPLAN 34A type. We do not believe that SVN is yet in a position to mount larger actions so long as the security situation in the near vicinity of Saigon remains precarious. We are impressed with the fact that a battalion-sized attack could have occurred within 4 miles of Saigon without any advance warning. We would welcome your further comments on Saigon reaction to today's announcement, as well as your continuing assessment of the political temperature there.

Rusk

Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, (FRUS) 1964 - 1968, Volume I, Vietnam 1964. Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1992. pp. 603 - 604.

The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution

LBJ's Speech to the American People, August 4, 1964

My fellow Americans:

As President and Commander in Chief, it is my duty to the American people to report that renewed hostile actions against United States ships on the high seas in the Gulf of Tonkin have today required me to order the military forces of the United States to take action in reply.

The initial attack on the destroyer Maddox, on August 2, was repeated today by a number of hostile vessels attacking two U.S. destroyers with torpedoes. The destroyers and supporting aircraft acted at once on the orders I gave after the initial act of aggression. We believe at least two of the attacking boats were sunk. There were no U.S. losses.

The performance of commanders and crews in this engagement is in the highest tradition of the United States Navy. But repeated acts of violence against the Armed Forces of the United States must be met not only with alert defense but with positive reply. That reply is being given as I speak to you tonight. Air action is now in execution against gunboats and certain supporting facilities in North Viet-Nam which have been used in these hostile operations.

In the larger sense this new act of aggression, aimed directly at our own forces, again brings home to all of us in the United States the importance of the struggle for peace and security in Southeast Asia. Aggression by terror against the peaceful villagers of South Viet-Nam has now been joined by open aggression on the high seas against the United States of America. The determination of all Americans to carry out our full commitment to the people and to the Government of South Viet-Nam will be redoubled by this outrage. Yet our response, for the present, will be limited and fitting. We Americans know, although others appear to forget, the risks of spreading conflict.

We still seek no wider war.

I have instructed the Secretary of State to make this position totally clear to friends and to adversaries and, indeed, to all. I have instructed Ambassador Stevenson to raise this matter immediately and urgently before the Security Council of the United Nations. Finally, I have today met with the leaders of both parties in the Congress of the United States, and I have informed them that I shall immediately request the Congress to pass a resolution making it clear that our Government is united in its determination to take all necessary measures in support of freedom and in defense of peace in Southeast Asia. I have been given encouraging assurance by these leaders of both parties that such a resolution will be promptly introduced, freely and expeditiously debated, and passed with overwhelming support.

And just a few minutes ago I was able to reach Senator Goldwater, and I am glad to say that he has expressed his support of the statement that I am making to you tonight.

It is a solemn responsibility to have to order even limited military action by forces whose overall strength is as vast and as awesome as those of the United States of America, but it is my considered conviction, shared throughout your Government, that firmness in the right is indispensable today for peace.

That firmness will always be measured.

Its mission is peace.

Source: Department of State Bulletin, August 24, 1964, vol. 51, p. 259.

Galloway, John. The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution. Rutherford, New Jersey: Fairleigh Dickinson Press, 1970. pp. 169 - 170.

Dean Rusk Official to E. Abel

"... Question by Elie Abel.

What explanation, then, can you come up with for this unprovoked attack?

Answer by Secretary of State Dean Rusk.

Well I haven't been able, quite frankly, to come to a fully satisfactory explanation. There is a great gulf of understanding between that world and our world, ideological in character. They see what we think of as the real world in wholly different terms. Their very processes of logic are different. So that it's very difficult to enter into each other's minds across that great ideological gulf.

I can't come to a rational explanation of it. Perhaps they will offer one some day. But thus far we have to take it as we see it. And the essential fact was that our vessels were being attacked on the high seas by these boats and we had to do something about it...."

Interview of Secretary of State Dean Rusk

by Elie Abel of NBC television

broadcast on August 5, 1964

Transcript from Department of State Bulletin ,

Volume LI, Number 1313, August 24, 1964, p. 269.

Stockdale on Tonkin

James Stockdale, a U.S. Navy pilot, who flew over the Maddox at the time of the first incident, and over the Maddox and the Turner Joy during the second alleged incident, gives a vivid description of what he saw in his book (co-written with his wife, Sybil), In Love and War (New York: Harper and Row, 1984) (Revised Edition, Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1990), Chapter 1. pp. 19 - 25.

Sunday August 2, 1964

After the attack on the Maddox, Commander Stockdale returns to the Carrier Ticonderoga. He was an eye - witness to the PT - boat attack on the Maddox.

". . . It was my four-hundredth carrier-arrested landing in a Crusader.

I immediately went down to the intelligence spaces to see what sense could be made of that crazy PT- boat attack against our destroyer. Nobody seemed to know what the motive was. I learned that the Maddox had had some warning of the attack not only from observing the boats, but from intercepted radio transmissions. They were carrying an intelligence-communication van between their stacks; in it, a small navy and marine Vietnamese - language - trained crew could listen in on the chatter of some North Vietnamese military command circuits on the beach. From such intercepts during the morning and early afternoon hours, the Maddox had figured out that something was up. Moreover, I learned that the PT boats had fired a couple of torpedoes at the Maddox, both of which missed, and had also fired at her with those big machine guns down whose barrels I had just been looking. The only hit the destroyer took was from one small machine - gun round, which punctured the pedestal of a gun director and fell harmlessly into a compartment below."

Night of Tuesday, August 4, 1964

". . . I maneuvered close to the water, unencumbered by a wing man, lights off, trying to find whatever boat the destroyers were talking about and blast it immediately.

I had the best seat in the house from which to detect boats--if there were any. I didn't have to look through surface haze and spray like the destroyers did, and yet I could see the destroyers every move vividly. Time and again I flew right over the Maddox and the Joy, throttled back, lights out, like a near-silent stalking owl, conserving fuel at a 250-knot loiter speed. I could roll over and look right up the two churning phosphorescent destroyer wakes and see their decks heaving in choppy seas, spray coming over their bows on easterly headings as they maneuvered and kept the airwaves full of course-change signals. There must have been twenty knots of surface wind down there.

When the destroyers were convinced they had some battle action going, I zigged and zagged and fired where they fired unless it looked like I might get caught in their shot patterns or unless they had told me to fire somewhere else. The edges of the black hole I was flying in were still periodically lit by flashes of lightning--but no wakes or dark shapes other than those of the destroyers were ever visible to me.

"Batterup one-O-one [my voice call], we are taking a boat under fire abeam to port, two thousand yards.

"Rog, I see your fire; when you lift it, I'll go in and have a look and hose the area down."

"Batterup, we are in a hard port turn; we think there is a boat closing us from astern."

"Rog, I see your port turn; I can always see your wakes; I will fire astern of you."

And so on into the night. I was sweating like a pig, and periodically scaring myself to death. I shouted to myself as I brought years and years of day, night, extra cruise, extra weekend, seat-of-the pants, stick-and-throttle experience into full play at last: . . ."

Stockdale returned to the Ticonderoga safely. He never saw any boats other than the Maddox and the Turner Joy. Stockdale's testimony effectively rebuts the claim that there was an attack on the Maddox and the Turner Joy on the night of August 4th.

". . . .Wheeling into the ready room I had hurriedly left three hours before, I came face-to-face with about ten assorted ship's company, air group, and staff intelligence officers--all with sheepish grins on their faces. The mood of the group was informal and mirthful; obviously they had some big joke to tell me. "What in hell has been going on out there?" they laughingly asked.

"Damned if I know," I said. "It's really a flap. The guy on the Maddox Air Control radio was giving blow-by-blow accounts just like he did on Sunday. Turning left, turning right, torpedoes to the right of us, torpedoes to the left of us--boom, boom, boom! I got right down there and shot at whatever they were shooting at. I came around toward the destroyers once, right on the deck, chasing some imaginary PT boat they said was running up behind them, and fired every type of weapon I had--including a sidewinder! I thought for a second that its heat-seeker head had picked the Turner Joy's hot stack, but luckily I had let it go when I was so low it hit the water. A little higher and wow!" I was rather giddy by this time, and delivered this "debriefing" with elaborate gestures as a kind of catch-on hilarity enveloped the room.

"Did you see any boats?"

"Not a one. No boats, no boat wakes, no ricochets off boats, no boat gunfire, no torpedo wakes--nothing but black sea and American firepower. But for goodness' sake, I must be going crazy. How could all of that commotion have built up out there without something being behind it?"

"Have a look at this. This is what Herrick, the commodore on the Maddox, has been putting out, flash precedence, plain language to Washington and the world in general tonight."

I was handed a few sheets of a rough communication log--on which were transcribed all the messages from the Maddox since I had left the ship. Alongside each message was the time of its receipt. For most of the two and a half hours, there had been a message every few minutes--except they had come more frequently near the end. At first glance it looked like the same stuff I had been hearing on my cockpit radio all night--"Taking boat to port under fire with main battery...Torpedo bearing zero-eight-zero degrees," etc. But as I studied the document, I realized that this was not the record of Clem's[a boxing announcer on the radio in the 1930's] blow-by-blow; there were also things in it that I wasn't getting on the air, the sort of stuff the commodore was probably shouting to his radioman inside the pilothouse.

The document as a whole read like a monologue of a man turning himself inside out. For the first hour or so, it was all assertive, all Clem McCarthy-type stuff. Then every so often a message of doubt, a message expressing reservations, would pop up--about sonars not operating properly, about radars not locking on targets, about probable false targets, about false perceptions due to lack of visibility. But still, it mainly reflected the tone of victimized vessels being attacked--that is, until I got to the last page and a half; then, as I read down them, everything seemed to flip around. There was denial of the correctness of immediately preceding messages, doubt about the validity of whole blocks of messages, ever more skeptical appraisal of detection equipment's performance, the mention of overeager sonar operators, the lack of any visual sightings of boats by the destroyers, and finally there were lines expressing doubt that there had been any boats out there that night at all. The commodore urged a complete evaluation of the mix-up before any further action be taken.

"My God," I exclaimed, tossing my helmet toward the low ceiling, "three hours of terror, almost busting my ass, nearly flying into the water, shooting rockets at nothing, sidewinders at destroyers, all brought about by spooked operators and spooked equipment! It was all a Chinese fire drill! I'm pooped; I'll see you guys tomorrow."

I wound my way up forward to my stateroom, put my flight

gear in my locker, and washed my hands and face in my Stateroom

sink. I looked at myself in the mirror. Boy, you look tired, I thought. But it's good to feel good. At least you didn't fly into that water; and at least there's a commodore up there in the Gulf who has the guts to blow the whistle on a screw-up, and take the heat to set the record straight.

As I lay down and turned out the bed lamp, musing on the levity of the late-night session in the ready room and the absurdity of the goings - on up in the Gulf, I would never have guessed that commodores in charge on the scene of action are sometimes not allowed to blow the whistle on a screw-up or set records straight themselves. . . ."

Wednesday, August 5, 1964

"After what seemed like a very short night, I felt myself being

shaken. Somewhere in the distance I could hear a pleading voice calling me "commander" That was odd; my men would call me "skipper." I groggily opened my eyes and in the dim light coming through my open stateroom door I could make out the single bars of an ensign's or junior-grade lieutenant's rank insignia on the collar of the man hovering over me. What's going on? Who would send

an officer to wake a person up?

"Who are you?" I asked.

"I'm the junior officer of the deck, sir. The captain sent me down to wake you. We just got a message from Washington telling U, to prepare to launch strikes against the beach, sir. Both the 'Connie and we are to launch strikes. The 'Tico has a six-plane strike against a PT-boat base, sir, and a big strike against the oil- storage facilities in the city of Vinh. The captain wants you to start

getting ready to lead the big one, sir. It's now a quarter of five, sir; ,we set our clocks ahead one hour in the night. Please get up, sir;your target is Washington's priority number one."

"What's the idea of the strikes?"

"Reprisal, sir."

"Reprisal for what?"

"For last night's attack on the destroyers, sir."

I flipped on my bed lamp and the young officer left.

I felt like I had been doused with ice water. How do I get in touch with the president? He's going off half-cocked.

As I spattered my face with cold water and pulled on my khaki trousers, I felt like I was one of the few men in the world who really understood the enormity of what was going to happen. The bad portents of the moment were suffocating. We were about to launch a war under false pretenses, in the face of the on - scene military commander's advice to the contrary. This decision had to be driven from way up at the top. After all, I'd spent the summer reading messages setting up our Laos operations and I had grown familiar with the linkages. It was all straight shot: Washington, Saigon, Ambassador Vientiane. On - scene naval officers couldn't turn that on or off any more than they could this thing now. There is no question of coming up with the truth from out here. The truth is out. Even a small potato like me is on the wire with a straight report of "no boats."

The fact that a war was being conceived out here in the humid muck of the Tonkin Gulf didn't bother me so much; it seemed obvious that a tinderbox situation prevailed here and that there would be war in due course anyway. But for the long pull it seemed to me important that the grounds for entering war be legitimate. I felt it was a bad portent that we seemed to be under the control of a mindless Washington bureaucracy, vain enough to pick their own legitimacies regardless of evidence On second thought, this had after all been a night I would surely tell my grandchildren about. . . ."

Source: Stockdale, Jim and Sybil. In Love and War, revised and updated. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1990. pp. 19 - 25.

Also see the testimony of Lieutenant, j.g., Everett Alvarez, Jr., who flew over the Maddox and the Turner Joy that dark and stormy night. He saw no enemy ships. Everett Alvarez, Jr. and Anthony S. Pitch, Chained Eagle (New York: Donald I. Fine, 1989), Chapter 1. Alvarez would be shot down on the Wednesday, "retaliation" raid and would be held prisoner in the DRV until 1973.

The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution

Joint Hearings - Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees

United States Senate August 6, 1964.

. . . .

Chairman FULBRIGHT. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Statement of Hon. Robert S. McNamara, Secretary of Defense

Secretary MCNAMARA. Mr. Chairman, I prepared a statement which is available to members of the committee that outlines the events that led up to the attack of the U.S. forces on August 4. You will recall that our destroyer Maddox operating in international waters was attacked on the 2d; Maddox and the Turner Joy on the 4th and we responded on the 4th, Washington time. I would be happy to read this statement, it is seven pages, or answer questions about the details, whichever you choose.

Chairman FULBRIGHT. If you would care to, put it in the record. Most of us have heard the facts but if you could highlight it.

Secretary MCNAMARA. I would be happy to do so. The attack of August 2, you will recall, was by three North Vietnamese patrol boats against the destroyer Maddox operating in the Gulf of Tonkin between Hainan Island at the North Vietnamese coast in international waters between 25 and 30 miles off the coast.

Three PT boats attacked the Maddox, launched torpedoes against it; Maddox returned fire with her 5-inch guns, believed they destroyed one of the boats, the other two were destroyed either by the Maddox or the carrier Ticonderoga's planes which you can see positioned south of Hainan Island.

I reported on Monday in my briefings to the Congress that I believed this to be an isolated incident, perhaps a miscalculation or misunderstanding by the North Vietnamese, and we did not anticipate it would be repeated.

Contrary to my estimate it was repeated on August 4 at which time between three and six North Vietnamese patrol boats attacked the Maddox and the Turner Joy which had been sent to accompany it on its patrol course.

At this time the vessels were about 60 miles off the coast of North Vietnam. The attack occurred at night. It appeared to be a deliberate attack in the nature of an ambush. Torpedoes were launched, automatic weapons fire was directed against the vessels. They returned the fire. Aircraft from the Ticonderoga and by this time the Constellation which had been brought down [deleted] to support the Ticonderoga, were sent over the vessels and returned the patrol boat's fire. We believe that two of the patrol boats were destroyed as a result of the fire. Engagement was broken off after 2 to 3 hours of fire. The meetings in Washington you are familiar with, the following day.

The President decided that this deliberate attack, and it was clearly a deliberate attack, a preplanned attack, required a military response. We, therefore, launched in the daylight hours about noontime local time, about midnight on August 5, 12:30 in the morning August 5, against the bases from which these boats had come, against the boats themselves, and against certain support facilities, particularly a petroleum depot at Vinh; 64 sorties were directed against these targets. We believe that about 25 boats were damaged or destroyed, certain shore facilities were destroyed. About 90 percent of the Vinh petroleum depot which contains about 10 percent of the total storage capacity of petroleum in North Vietnam was destroyed.

We think there were very few civilian casualties because these bases and the depot were in isolated portions of North Vietnam. Our losses were two aircraft destroyed, two pilots lost, and two aircraft very slightly damaged.

The patrol is being resumed and will continue its normal course southward in the Gulf of Tonkin. . . .

Source: Galloway: pp. 190 - 191

61. THE TONKlN GULF DEBATE AND RESOLUTlON

During the first four days of August 1964, the Johnson administration claimed that U.S. warships were twice attacked by North Vietnamese torpedo boats in international waters (the Gulf of Tonkin, off North Vietnam). Johnson ordered immediate retaliatory air raids on North Vietnam, then asked the U.S. Congress for the powers embodied in the following resolution. Congress overwhelmingly passed the resolution. Senator I. William Fulbright (Dem.-Ark.), later a leading antiwar voice, helped his close friend, the President, pass the resolution over a few scattered, but ominous, questions. Evidence later revealed that the Administration had not told the full truth about the attacks, but Johnson nevertheless received a virtual blank check in waging the war.

(Source, Congressional/ Record, August 5-7, 1964, pp. 18132-33, 18406-7, 18458-59, 18470-71.)

THE RESOLUTION:

Whereas naval units of the Communist regime in Vietnam, in violation of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and of international law, have deliberately and repeatedly attacked United States naval vessels lawfully present in international waters, and have thereby created a serious threat to international peace;

Whereas these attacks are part of a deliberate and systematic campaign of aggression that the Communist regime in North Vietnam has been waging against its neighbors and the nations joined with them in the collective defense of their freedom;

Whereas the United States is assisting the peoples of southeast Asia to protect their freedom and has no territorial, military or political ambitions in that area, but desires only that these peoples should be left in peace to work out their own destinies in their own way:

now, therefore, be it Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

That the Congress approves and supports the determination of the President, as Commander in Chief, to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression.

Sec. 2. The United States regards as vital to its national interest and to world peace the maintenance of international peace and security in southeast Asia. Consonant with the Constitution and the Charter of the United Nations and in accordance with its obligations under the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, the United States is, therefore, prepared, as the President determines, to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force, to assist any member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance in defense of its freedom.

Sec. 3. This resolution shall expire when the President shall determine that the peace and security of the area is reasonably assured by international conditions created by action of the United Nations or otherwise, except that it may be terminated earlier by concurrent resolution of the Congress.

August. 6, 1964. [Debate in the U.S. Senate]

MR. NELSON [Gaylord Nelson, Dem-Wisc.] . . . Am I to understand that it is the sense of Congress that we are saying to the executive branch: "If it becomes necessary to prevent further aggression, we agree now, in advance, that you may land as many divisions as deemed necessary, and engage in a direct military assault on North Vietnam if it becomes the judgment of the Executive, the Commander in Chief, that this is the only way to prevent further aggression"2

MR. FULBRIGHT [J. William Fulbright, Dem.-Ark.]. As I stated, section 1 is intended to deal primarily with aggression against our forces. . . . I believe section 2 deals with the SEATO area, which we are committed to protect under our treaties, particularly when they ask for our assistance. . . .

I do not know what the limits are. I do not think this resolution can be determinative of that fact. I think it would indicate that he [the President] would take reasonable means first to prevent any further aggression, or repel further aggression against our own forces, and that he will live up to our obligations under the SEATO treaty and with regard to the protocol states. I do not know how to answer the Senator's question and give him an absolute assurance that large numbers of troops would not be put ashore. I would deplore it. And I hope the conditions do not justify it now. . . .

August. 7, 1964

MR. NELSON. In view of the differing interpretations which have been put upon the joint resolution with respect to what the sense of Congress is, I should like to have this point clarified. I have great confidence in the President. However, my concern is that we in Congress could give the impression to the public that we are prepared at this time to change our , mission and substantially expand our commitment. If that is what the sense of Congress is, I am opposed to the resolution. I therefore ask the f distinguished Senator from Arkansas if he would consent to accept an amendment [that explicitly says Congress wants no extension of the present military conflict and no U.S. direct military involvement].

MR. FULBRIGHT . . . The Senator has put into his amendment a statement of policy that is unobjectionable. However, I cannot accept the amendment under the circumstances. I do not believe it is contrary to the joint resolution, but it is an enlargement. I am informed that the House is now voting on this resolution. The House joint resolution is about to be presented to us. I cannot accept the amendment and go to conference with it, and thus take responsibility for delaying matters. . . .

MR. GRUENING [Ernest Gruening, Dem.-Alaska] ... Regrettably, I find myself in disagreement with his [the President's] southeast Asian policy. . . . The serious events of the past few days, the attack by North Vietnamese vessels on American warships and our reprisal, strikes me as the inevitable and foreseeable concomitant and consequence of U.S., unilateral military aggressive policy in southeast Asia. . . . We now are about to authorize the President if he sees fit to move our Armed Forces ... not only into South Vietnam, but also into North Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, and of course the authorization includes all the rest of the SEATO nations.

That means sending our American boys into combat in a war in which we have no business, which is not our war, into what we have been misguidedly drawn, which is steadily being escalated. This resolution is a further authorization for escalation unlimited. I am opposed to sacrificing a single American boy in this venture. We have lost far too many already. . . .

MR. MORSE [Wayne Morse, Dem.-Ore.] . . . I believe that history will record that we have made a great mistake in subverting and circumventing the Constitution of the United States, article I, section 8 [which gives Congress the power to declare war] thereof by means of this resolution . . . I believe [this resolution] to be a historic mistake. I believe that within the next century, future generations will look with dismay and great disappointment upon a Congress which is now about to make such a historic mistake. Our constitutional rights are no better than the preservation of our procedural guarantees under the Constitution. . . .

[The Resolution passed 88-2, Gruening and Morse voting against.]

Source: America in Vietnam. Williams, William Appleman, Thomas McCormick, Lloyd Gardner and Walter LaFeber, editors. New York: W.W. Norton, 1985. pp. 236 - 239.

The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution

Democratic Republic of Vietnam

North Vietnamese Response to Tonkin allegations

12. Statement by the Spokesman of the Viet Nam People's Army High Command Regarding U.S. Warships' Provocative Activities in North Vietnamese Territorial Waters

In the last two days, American news agencies made a fuss

about the so-called "unprovoked attack" by Navy ships of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam on the U.S. destroyer Maddox which took place on August 2 off North Viet Nam's coast. Meanwhile, the U.S. State Department spokesman bluntly denied the denunciations made by the High Command of the Viet Nam People's Army and the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam Foreign Ministry concerning the shelling by U.S. warships of islands belonging to the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam and the bombing of North Vietnamese localities near the Viet Nam -Laos border by U.S. aircraft coming from the direction of Laos.

In this connection, the Spokesman of the Viet - Nam People's Army High Command declares as follows:

Public opinion in Viet Nam and the world knows very well that in carrying out their policy of aggression and war in South Viet Nam as well as in Cambodia and Laos, the U.S. imperialists have not only used their 7th Fleet in the Pacific for shows of force in the open seas from the South China Sea to the Gulf of Thailand, but have also used warships of that fleet to cover the forces of their henchmen in South Viet Nam in their provocative activities against the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam.

Over recent times, in an attempt to retrieve their defeat and flounder in South Viet Nam, along with increased military buildup and intensified war efforts, the U.S. imperialists and their henchmen have not only ranted about extending the war to the North but have also frantically conducted provocative and sabotage activities against the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam.

Warships of the U.S. 7th Fleet stationed on a permanent basis off Da Nang naval port have on many occasions covered ships and boats of their henchmen in South Viet Nam which come to the North daily to carry out provocative activities, infringe upon the territorial waters of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam, seize fishing boats and land spy-commandos for sabotage activities in the coastal areas.

At the same time, their aircraft increase activities in the airspace of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam, dropping spy commandos on North Viet Nam. Spy-commandos landed in the coastal area of Quang Binh province recently as well as all other groups of U.S - Khanh agents introduced into North Viet Nam have fallen into the hands of our armed forces and people.

Continuing their feverish plan to provoke and sabotage the North, on July 30 the U.S. imperialists and their henchmen dispatched warships to encroach upon North Viet Nam's territorial waters and shell Hon Me and Hon Ngu islands which are part of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam's territory.

In the night of July 31-August 1, the U.S. imperialists again sent a destroyer to encroach upon North Viet Nam's territorial waters in Quang Binh province. This warship had been cruising for two days, August 1 and 2, between Hon Mat island (Nghe An) and Hon Me island (Thanh Hoa) to intimidate fishing boats of our people, openly infringing upon our territorial waters. In the afternoon of August 2, it encountered our patrol boats between Hon Me and Lach Truong in our territorial waters. In face of the provocations by the sea rovers, our patrol ships took action to defend our territorial waters and fishermen and chased the enemy ship out of our territorial waters. Afterwards, our patrol ships returned to their bases.

This is what happened in the afternoon of August 2. The U.S. imperialists are raising a hue and cry about what they call "an unprovoked attack by three torpedo boats of North Viet Nam". They have made such clamors to cover their own acts of provocation and sabotage, their violation of the territorial waters and airspace and their encroachment on the sovereignty and territory of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam.

It should be pointed out that the above-mentioned activities of the U.S. Navy in North Viet Nam's territorial waters coincided with the activities of U.S. aircraft which, taking off from bases in Thailand and Laos, bombed the Nam Can border post and rocketed Noong De village in Ky Son district, Nghe An province, near the Viet Nam-Laos border on August 1 and 2, 1964. The High Command of the Viet Nam People's Army strongly denounces to public opinion at home and abroad these provocative activities of the U.S. Government and its henchmen in South Viet Nam and Laos. The Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam regards them as extremely serious violations of the 1954 Geneva Agreements on Viet Nam and the 1962 Geneva Agreements on Laos, and blatant encroachments upon the sovereignty and territory of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam, which resulted in aggravating the situation in this area. Determined to defend the peaceful construction work of the North Vietnamese people and the security of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam, the army and people of Viet Nam sternly warn the U.S. imperialists and their henchmen that any acts of provocation, sabotage and aggression on their part would be subject to due punishment.

The High Command of the Viet Nam People's Army declares that the U.S. Government, together with its henchmen in South Viet Nam and Laos, must bear responsibility for all the consequences arising from their acts of provocation, sabotage and encroachment upon the security of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam.

Hanoi, August 4, 1964

Galloway, pp. 526 - 528

The "Second Attack" as seen from North Vietnam

There was no second attack.

13. Statement by the Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam Concerning the U.S. Government's Brazen Air Strafing and Bombing Against the Territory of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam.

On August 5, 1964, jet planes taking off from the U.S. Seventh Fleet in the Pacific flew in many waves to strafe and bomb a number of places in the Vinh-Ben Thuy area, near the Gianh River mouth and in the close vicinity of Hong Gai city, causing losses and damages to the local population.

What is extremely serious is that orders for the attack were given to the U.S. Air Force by U.S. President L. Johnson himself.

As is known, the U.S. imperialists are being defeated and bogged down in their war of aggression in South Viet Nam. To extricate themselves from this situation, on the one hand, they are making every effort to step up the war there, and on the other, they are frantically engaging in provocation and sabotage activities against the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam, and threatening to extend the war to the North. At the same time, they are intensifying their intervention in Laos and attempting to jeopardize the independence and neutrality of Cambodia. Over the recent days, aircraft of the U.S. aggressors taking off from airports in Thailand and Laos have twice strafed and bombed Nam Can and Noong De, two points in the territory of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam near the Viet Nam-Laos border. At the same time, they have sent their naval craft to repeatedly intrude into the territorial waters of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam and shell Hon Ngu and Hon Me Islands and other places along the coast of North Viet Nam. The air strafing and bombing of August 5, 1964, are obviously a premeditated act of war within the U.S. Government's plan for intensified provocation and sabotage against the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam.

To cover up its dark scheme, the United States has circulated the cock-and-bull story of an alleged second attack on two U.S. destroyers in the Gulf of North Viet Nam. But this perfidious maneuvers will deceive no one. The August 5, 1964 air attack on the territory of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam has further exposed the U.S. rulers' repeatedly stated aggressive designs and scheme to extend the war to North Viet Nam.

This is an extremely serious act of war of the U.S. Government towards the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam, an act which constitutes a blatant violation of international law and the 1954 Geneva Agreements on Indo-China, and adds to the danger of extended war in Indo-China and South-East Asia. The U.S. Government has defied the opposition of the U.S. people and the peace-loving peoples of the world to its policy of aggression and war in Indo-China.

The more truculent and reckless the U.S. imperialists turn out to be, the more the people all over Viet Nam will close their ranks and show determination to defeat them. The more the peoples of Laos, Cambodia and other South-East Asian countries realize their cruel features, the more they are filled with hatred and the more vigorously they will combat them.

The Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam strongly exposes before world opinion the above acts of war by the U.S. Government, and demands that the latter stop forthwith all acts of provocation and sabotage against the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam, and correctly implement the 1954 Geneva Agreements on Viet Nam.

The Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam, deeply attached to peace, has always respected and scrupulously implemented the 1954 Geneva Agreements on Viet Nam, but it is firmly resolved not to allow the U.S. imperialists and their agents to violate its sovereignty and territory, and destroy the peaceful labor of the people in North Viet Nam. Any acts of provocation and aggression against the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam are doomed to failure in the face of the strength of the entire Vietnamese people. The U.S. Government and its agents must bear full responsibility for all the grave consequences arising out of their bellicose acts in this part of the world. The Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam earnestly calls upon the participants in the 1954 Geneva Conference on Indo-China, the socialist countries and other peace loving countries in the world to pay particular attention to the extremely grave situation now being created in Viet Nam and Indo-China by the U.S. imperialists, and to take timely and positive steps with a view to staying the U.S. warmongers' hands, safeguarding peace in Indo-China and South-East Asia, and contributing to the maintenance of world peace.

Hanoi, August 6, 1964

Galloway. pp. 529 - 531

Ambassador Taylor on Tonkin Attacks.

Ambassador to the Republic of Vietnam, Maxwell D. Taylor, retired U.S. Army General, was well aware of the American supported attacks on the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. He wanted them to be resumed as soon as possible.

pp. 646 - 647 Foreign Relations, 1964-1968,Volume I

Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State

Saigon, August 7, 1964--noon.

332. For Rusk from Taylor. DOD for McNamara, White House for Bundy. As you are aware, we have suspended actions under Operations Plan 34-A in order to avoid confusing signals associated with recent events in the Gulf of Tonkin. The JCS has now asked CINCPAC to recommend a date for the resumption of these actions. From a military point of view, maritime operations could be resumed about Aug 10. Air operations, which depend upon the moon phase, could be scheduled to begin Aug 17.

From this perspective, I cannot judge the total political consequences which might result from resumption of these actions at an early date. In general, I would expect that, unless the DRV obtains jet fighters in the near future, air operations, which are principally resupply drops and propaganda leaflets drops could be resumed with the moon phase on Aug 17. However the maritime operations, which include two or three bombardments from ship to shore, as well as junk captures, could adversely interfere with action underway in the Security Council and elsewhere. I therefore hesitate to concur in any recommendation by MACV to CINCPAC that these maritime operations recommence as early as Aug 10 without knowing Washington's planning in the larger political arena.

On the other hand, it is my conviction that we must resume these operations and continue their pressure on North Vietnam as soon as possible, leaving no impression that we or the South Vietnamese have been deterred from our operations because of the Tonkin Gulf incidents. I would therefore appreciate your collective guidance in the light of the circumstances which you can perceive from the Washington perspective. Since the boats employed in the maritime operations have been dispersed and should be reassembled at their main base as soon as possible, I would appreciate an early response.

Taylor

Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, (FRUS) 1964 - 1968. Volume I, Vietnam 1964. Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1992. pp. 646 - 647.

The Nation comments on the Tonkin Gulf Incidents

Monday, September 7th 1964

Volume 199, Number 5

pp. 81 - 82

EDlTORlALS

Deeper and Deeper

Now that the guns of Tonkin are stilled, everyone agrees that President Johnson's popularity rating went up. But the Vietcong and the North Vietnamese are not affected in the slightest by the President's popularity and the Congress rallying around the flag: that's all 9,000 miles away. On the scene, things are worse than ever from the American standpoint. As Gen. S. L. A. Marshall points out, cruisers are of no use in jungles, and shooting up some North Vietnamese shore bases cannot change the course of the war. The Vietcong, who were already doing quite well, are now very likely to do still better. They are getting increased assistance from the North, and not only more, but the quality has been upgraded. Most of the Vietcong are indigenous rebels; a certain number of them may have been trained in Ho Chi Minh's army, but that was the only time they were north of the 17th parallel. Now, however, Hanoi is said to be sending down Vietnamese who have lived in the North all their lives, with officers who are veterans of the victorious war with France. These invaders are probably still far fewer in number than our 20,000 "advisers" with the South Vietnamese forces; nevertheless, where our troubles were formerly mostly in the Mekong Delta, now some five Vietcong battalions are reported to be operating in the central highlands. It is not the same old tiresome war, as some correspondents have been assuring their editors back home. It is something much worse, and the end is not yet.

Still, if our problems were only military, we might manage to hang on, or even improve our position temporarily. But if there is anything about this war

on which soldiers, politicians, journalists, South Vietnamese and North Vietnamese all agree, it is that this is predominantly a political war. Consider, then, the re recent for tune s of General-Premier-President Nguyen Khanh, whom the United States has pictured as God's gift to South Vietnam since he seized power last January. After the great U.S. naval victory in the Tonkin Gulf, Khanh, like his late predecessor Ngo Dinh Diem, declared a state of emergency throughout South Vietnam. There would be censorship; stringent controls over travel, food and frivolity (unless one had money); no more nonsense about search warrants; and drumhead courts-martial without appeal from the death sentence for traitors and saboteurs, i.e., enemies of the regime.

What was the result? The students rose against the dictator. They rioted and demolished the offices of the Saigon broadcasting station. Khanh backed down. It may have been out of the kindness of his heart, but it will be widely assumed that he just didn't have control of the police. If he has lost the police, he may next lose the army.

Khanh is our boy. He was Henry Cabot Lodge's protégé; he is now Maxwell Taylor's protégé. The people know it. For the first time, the riots took on anti-American tones. Probably this warning, like preceding ones, will not be heeded. Our latest scheme is to "share" command of troops with the South Vietnamese. There is no such thing as sharing command in combat. We shall be taking over command. Then, as our woes continue, only one recourse will be left -- getting ourselves fully engaged in a full-scale war on the Asian continent. At the end of a long line of them, that would be the culminating folly.

Negotiate Now!

There are signs that the Johnson Administration would like to draw back from the brink in Vietnam. A 45-page CIA paper arguing that we could not win the war was appraised by the agency's Board of National Estimates and approved in general terms. With this imprimatur, in some way it fell into the hands of the Chicago Tribune. Instead of maintaining discreet silence, the Administration released the document, emphasizing that it did not embody official policy. None the less the circumstances remind one of Byron's heroine who, "vowing she would ne'er consent, consented."

But it would never do to consent before the election, would it? Well, it might. What the Administration hopes is that the line can be held until Mr. Johnson is assured of another four years in the White House; then perhaps we can bargain. In the meantime a few victories would help our bargaining position. The trouble is that not victories but more defeats are in prospect. The basic weakness in the situation, as The Nation has emphasized time and again in the past three years, is simply that most of the South Vietnamese army does not want to fight. The peasants not only do not want to fight, but most of them side with the Vietcong, and most of the Vietcong forces are composed of embattled peasants. Under these conditions, and in view of the deteriorating state of the Khanh regime and the strife between the Catholics (most of whom probably favor a continuation of the war) and the Buddhist majority, the Johnson Administration may have nothing to say as to when and how the conference table is to be approached. We might have to sit down as losers.

There are certainly perils for Mr. Johnson in negotiations. That great patriot, Senator Goldwater, will make the most of any concessions the U.S. is forced to yield. Nothing will satisfy the Senator except total victory, especially when it is unobtainable and his opponent can be blamed. But then, it is a bad business either way, and Mr. Johnson can point out that neither he nor John Fitzgerald Kennedy got the U.S. into this footless war. It was started under the administration of General Eisenhower. Mr. Johnson might also bear in mind that no American President has ever been scalped for ending a war. General Eisenhower ended the stalemated Korean War, on terms somewhat

like those which are still obtainable in Vietnam, and received only praise and thanks from the American public.

In Paris, on August 18, the President's special envoy, Mr. Lodge, indicated that Washington has renounced the idea of a military solution in Vietnam. We are not a paper tiger, he emphasized, and have the means to escalate the war, but . . . This partial démarche brings us within hailing distance of President de Gaulle's often reiterated position that the war in Southeast Asia cannot be won by the West, and the neutralization of the peninsula should be discussed with the North Vietnamese and Chinese. Mr. Lodge speaks flawless French. Let him suggest to Mr. Johnson that it might be wise to desist from trying to collect bandages and petroleum jelly from the Scandinavians, return to Paris, and see what can be done to save face and get ourselves out of this mess.

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Letter to the editor

The Nation

Monday, September 14, 1964

Volume 199, Number 6

LETTERS

Voice of sanity

New York City

Dear Sirs:

All honor to Senators Wayne Morse and Ernest Gruening for voting against the joint Congressional resolution that, in effect, endorses our government's past and continuing massive intervention in Southeast Asia. Their courage in resisting the bandwagon, "extremist" psychology of an election year deserves the highest respect and praise. I predict that our nation's intervention in Southeast Asia during the past decade will be recognized in the future as one of its darkest episodes. And I further predict that the names of Senators Morse and Gruening will emerge then as representing the voice of sanity; good faith and reason....

Helen Mears