Folder 47 - Rostow

SR 2620 pp. 1, 2

The public opinion, as I say, had been gradually eroding in its support of the war, but it was only up to about 30% of the public who felt that we should do less rather than more. The largest group was still before Tet, about 55% felt we should do more. The first reaction to Tet was to increase the proportion of those describing themselves as hawks to over 60%, but when the President did not take decisive action, militarily, to conform to this mood and then decided he wasn't going to run, I think the combination of the lack of preparation of the people for Tet, which could have been avoidable, the bad projection of what happened at Tet to the American people by the media, the lack of a vigorous military response and then the President saying he wasn't going to run led a great many people who had supported not the President so much, he had only about 18% support for his tactics, but the 50plus% who were really hawks, said, Well, if we're not going to go in and win this thing decisively, let's get out or begin to get out. And that, I think was the progressive sort of defection that eroded the position down through '68…….

SR 2621 p. 8

If you're in a war, as we were, and war means people getting killed, your overriding objective has nothing to do with hawks and doves. Your overriding objective is to get the war over as soon as possible with a minimum loss of life. I myself felt that without enlarging the war a more decisive use of American power could have ended the war sooner. I was not about to make my judgment an occasion for withdrawing my support for President Johnson who took a different view of the appropriate conduct of the war.

SR 2619 p. 12
Re: public support of the war declining even before the Tet offensive

The Tet offensive came at a time when there had been a slow erosion of public support for the war and I think the reason for it was that I wanted to act more decisively militarily, but it was best stated in an interview with Pham Van Dong, with Bernard Fall, in 1942, around the end of the year in the Saturday Evening Post. What it said essentially was. "Americans do not like long, indecisive war, and therefore we shall win."